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This article examines the relationship between the struggle for African American civil rights and efforts to
expand tourism, conventions, and spectator sports in New Orleans, Louisiana, between 1954 and 1969.
Drawing on previously neglected archival sources and personal interviews, it considers how the pressure to
maintain New Orleans’s progressive image as an urbane tourist destination required abandoning Jim Crow
customs and embracing the growing national commitment to racial progress. It argues that an unlikely coali-
tion of civil rights activists, tourism interests, municipal officials, and a small segment of New Orleans’s old-
line social establishment adopted a tourism-related rhetoric to counter the city’s dominant discourses of rac-
ist resistance to change. By the late 1960s, New Orleans’s white leaders agreed that they could no longer
countenance overt racial discrimination if New Orleans was to maintain a favorable tourist image.
Keywords: tourism; civil rights; New Orleans; professional sports; race relations
New Orleans had long appealed to the white traveler in search of the
romance of the South. Shaded by moss-draped live oaks, laced with black iron
galleries, and lighted by flickering gas lamps, the Crescent City’s historic
homes conjured in tourists’ minds vivid pictures of the Old South’s greatest
city. The pageantry of Mardi Gras and profligacy of Bourbon Street, combined
with the strains of jazz and the aroma of simmering Creole food wafting
through the languid air, completed the city’s romantic but gritty image. African
American cultural contributions underlay most aspects of the tourist experi-
ence in New Orleans, but in the French Quarter, white promoters cast blacks
merely as supporting actors who furnished service and amusement in a tourist-
oriented tableau. Blacks cooked famed Creole delicacies in French Quarter
restaurants, sold pralines in the French Market, carried flambeaux in night
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Research for this article is drawn from the New Orleans Public Library City Archives;
University of New Orleans Special Collections; Amistad Research Center; newspapers; and secondary
sources from the period. A shorter version of this article was presented at the Ninth National Conference on
American Planning History, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Camden, New Jersey, November 1–4, 2001.
Thanks to the panelists and audience for their helpful comments. Thanks also to Lawrence N. Powell and
Arnold R. Hirsch for offering suggestions and insights, as well as to the anonymous reviewers, whose careful
reading and thoughtful criticism have improved this article.
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parades, threw coconuts from the Zulu floats, blew horns for second-line pro-
cessions, conjured spells in voodoo demonstrations, and drove mule-drawn
tour buggies around Jackson Square. It would not be a stretch to argue that
New Orleans’s distinctive tourist image, right down to the bricks and mortar of
the celebrated French Quarter, was built on the backs of African slaves and
their descendents.
Ironically, while much of the city’s peculiar charm sprang from Afro-
Caribbean roots, blacks were seldom beneficiaries of their own contributions.
On the eve of World War II, even the recognition of jazz had largely abandoned
the art form’s originators. The Crescent City painstakingly tended its image as
a genteel, cosmopolitan city while clinging tenaciously to segregation. For
many years, white New Orleanians could afford the luxury of racial proscrip-
tion without worrying about the loss of tourist dollars. Even in the 1950s, when
many northerners began to question Jim Crow practices, New Orleans easily
held on to old ways because its tourist trade continued to cater primarily to
white southerners. As late as World War II, the modern tourism industry was in
its infancy. With its balmy climate, rich cultural heritage, celebrated hedonism,
and flamboyant Mardi Gras, New Orleans could bank on a steady influx of
tourists with only scant inducement. However, after the war, leisure travel and
the convention business quickly gathered momentum, and no city could afford
not to compete for its share of the trade. As black civil rights moved to center
stage in the postwar years, it gradually became essential to drop Jim Crow
practices to maintain a progressive image. Conventions and professional
sports teams, increasingly coveted by cities seeking to enter the “big league,”
could go wherever their backers wished, and by the 1960s, an increasing num-
ber blacklisted cities that failed to integrate racially.
Historians have seldom addressed the role of the tourism, conventions, and
spectator sports in exerting pressure on cities to desegregate public accommo-
dations.1 Throughout the nation, black activism and federal legislation ulti-
mately delivered American cities from Jim Crow. In New Orleans, the desire to
develop the tourist and convention trade and professional football also played
an important role in conditioning white political and business circles, making
them more receptive to increasingly resolute demands from African American
civil rights leaders once it became clear that segregation was hurting the city’s
national image.2 To a greater extent than in most cities, then, the Crescent
City’s effort to impress visitors colored the struggle over accommodations.
This article considers the interrelationship between concern over national
image and the black struggle for equal access to public accommodations,
schools, and jobs, demonstrating not only tourism’s impact on the direction of
racial change but also the importance of that change to the continued vitality of
what was on its way to becoming the city’s leading industry.3
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NURTURING NATIONAL IMAGE IN A SEGREGATED CITY
In New Orleans, where blacks had constituted a majority in the early nine-
teenth century and had since fallen to much lower levels for several decades,
the Second World War brought a new upsurge in the city’s black population.
The pull of bustling war industries and the centripetal effects of agricultural
mechanization in the rural Deep South converged to push the Crescent City’s
black population from less than one-third of the total in 1940 to nearly half by
1970. The rising black population meant that by the latter date, the city’s politi-
cians had to grapple with black voting power and could no longer deny
demands for legal equality.4
Prior to the 1960s, however, New Orleans’s leaders contented themselves
with reaping the benefits that arose naturally from the city’s being both a well-
situated seaport and a rich repository of history, food, music, and illicit plea-
sures. For many years, the “City that Care Forgot” filled its hotels and famous
restaurants with tourists and conventioneers with only minimal promotional
efforts. Commercial interests flocked to its river wharves for the simple reason
that the Mississippi River was there. Natural advantages bred a certain degree
of complacency among the city’s leaders. Even when World War II and the
subsequent election of progressive mayor deLesseps S. (“Chep”) Morrison
ushered in a decade of aggressive international trade promotion and massive
infrastructure improvements such as new ship terminals, roads, bridges, an
international airport, and a central train station, the city’s establishment
remained firmly entrenched and self-satisfied.5
Reliance on shipping and tourism as the two chief pillars of the urban econ-
omy proved highly compatible with the maintenance of the social status quo in
New Orleans. Jim Crow customs—mostly unwritten but widely understood—
and the city’s long-standing effort to attract white visitors dictated strict racial
separation in tourist facilities and attractions. Mayor Morrison explained the
city’s segregated public accommodations to a prospective tourist in 1948:
“These laws are an outgrowth of unfortunate experiences during and after the
Reconstruction Era, and are deemed advisable by most Southerners in order to
prevent conditions leading to racial intermarriage.”6
Especially before the city began to open up in the 1960s and to a lesser
extent for many years thereafter, black tourists experienced New Orleans very
differently than did whites. While whites flocked to the world-famous French
Quarter, most blacks had no interest in going to what they viewed as a white
attraction or did not wish to risk harassment by the New Orleans police. For the
local black community, the Vieux Carré was a place where blacks worked as
cooks, dishwashers, porters, bellhops, musicians, and domestics—not a place
to spend leisure time.7 The epicenter of black entertainment and leisure lay
beyond the periphery of the French Quarter, where Orleans and North
Claiborne avenues crossed in the city’s rough and tumble Sixth Ward.8
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Prior to the 1960s, many African Americans found it too expensive, un-
npleasant, and even dangerous to take vacations, particularly in the Deep
South. Unless one could afford to take the train, it was necessary to drive
through some of the most racially intolerant areas in the United States. One
could reach “America’s Most Interesting City,” which lay in the midst of
swamps, bayous, and lakes, only by passing through the Delta or Piney Woods
sections of Louisiana and Mississippi, where it was exceedingly difficult to
find roadside services catering to blacks but all too easy to find mean-spirited
whites. Under such circumstances, most blacks who traveled to New Orleans
did so to visit family and friends. The dearth of hotels catering to blacks
reflects the tendency of sojourning African Americans to stay either with fam-
ily or friends or in rooming houses.9
The Crescent City even posed problems for visiting African dignitaries,
whose position barely won them any special dispensations in a city trained to
view people as either white or black. In June 1954, just weeks after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision to force school deseg-
regation, the visit of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie and his all-black offi-
cial delegation to New Orleans presented Mayor Morrison with a delicate
situation. The Roosevelt Hotel (now the Fairmont), which billed itself “The
Pride of the South,” agreed to lodge Selassie and his entourage but vehemently
refused to allow the black officials to enter the hotel’s bar, restaurant, or Blue
Room supper club. City leaders kept the visitors occupied on a harbor cruise
and at dinners and receptions so they would not have time to see the ugly face
of the city’s racial prejudice. Morrison’s public relations director personally
sat in the Roosevelt lobby one night until 3 A.M. to see whether the Selassie
party would attempt to venture into the French Quarter, where they surely
would have faced overt discrimination. Municipal leaders operated under
extreme pressure, trying to invite leading local black citizens but not so many
that white leaders would be offended. In the end, both blacks and whites were
offended. In the wake of the difficult balancing act, the Morrison administra-
tion emerged not with a realization that the city’s public accommodations
should be open to all but instead with a great reluctance to invite black luminar-
ies in the future. The time had not yet arrived when concerns over the city’s
image could facilitate social change.10
The controversy over school desegregation and the influx of rural blacks in
the postwar years contributed to the breakdown of the mitigating effects of
interracial permissiveness on the absoluteness of Jim Crow custom in New
Orleans. Between 1954 and 1956, following the Brown decision, bitter South-
ern politicians defiantly passed many draconian race statutes that further codi-
fied long-standing de facto Jim Crow customs.11 In a reactionary show of
massive resistance to what they deemed federal meddling, Louisiana legisla-
tors ratified twenty-three new constitutional amendments in December 1954,
including measures that made black voter registration more difficult and pro-
scribed civil servants who associated with any organization that advocated
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racial equity, such as the Urban League or the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). African Americans found the July
1956 statute forbidding race mixing in social and sporting events particularly
offensive. Effectively barring all interracial contact in any form of public
accommodations, this law portended far-reaching, ill consequences for New
Orleans, a city with a cosmopolitan, open tourist image to uphold.12
The segregationist measure put a crimp in the city’s budding jazz revival by
barring the long-standing practice of black and white musicians sharing the
stage in the city’s bars and clubs. When enforcing the Jim Crow law against
integrated bands, New Orleans policemen concentrated on the French Quarter,
the area most visible to white natives and tourists. In January 1957, they
arrested black trumpeter Ernest “Punch” Miller and five other men, both black
and white, allegedly for disturbing the peace following a performance at a
Quarter bar. When they appeared in court, the judge dismissed the case and
warned the black jazzmen, “Don’t mix your cream with your coffee.”13 African
American trumpeter and New Orleans native Louis Armstrong, whose sextet
included blacks, whites, and a Hawaiian of Filipino extraction, scorned the
1956 law and vowed not to perform in his hometown until the state repealed it.
The musician, who had boarded a northbound Illinois Central passenger train
for a Chicago-based jazz career in 1922, lamented, “They treat me better all
over the world than they do in my own hometown—that even includes Missis-
sippi.”14
The law also gave license to police raids of bars and clubs that welcomed a
mixed clientele. While African Americans usually preferred not to venture
into the French Quarter’s nightspots, where they were clearly unwelcome,
some of the more intrepid white tourists journeyed to black clubs in dilapi-
dated wards beyond the tidy precincts of the Vieux Carré. There they hoped to
experience New Orleans entertainment in a less programmed setting.15 They
flocked to the Dew Drop Inn and the Snowflake to catch jazz gigs, or to the Cal-
edonia Club, where drag queens danced on the bar under purple lights.16 By the
latter half of the 1950s, they risked arrest for straying across the color line,
although the periodic raids in black neighborhoods still left more room for
interracial contact than was possible under authorities’ watchful eye in the
Quarter. In one of the more notorious raids, the New Orleans Police Depart-
ment bagged Hollywood actor Zachary Scott and his party at the Dew Drop.17
More injurious to New Orleans promoters’ hopes of expanding the city’s
tourist trade was the new law that banned all interracial contact at Louisiana
sporting events, affecting both athletes and spectators. Of particular concern
was the city’s Mid-Winter Sports Carnival, whose Sugar Bowl football match
ranked second only to Mardi Gras among the city’s special events in the num-
ber of visitors it attracted. In the two decades since its 1934 inception, the
Sugar Bowl had become one of the nation’s leading intercollegiate postseason
football games.18
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The opening salvo of racial contention surrounding the Sugar Bowl was
fired several months before the state legislature launched its legal barrage. In
late 1955, the Mid-Winter Sports Association (MWSA) invited the University
of Pittsburgh and Georgia Tech to square off in the New Year’s gridiron battle.
In the interest of economic gain, the organization prepared to accommodate
Pittsburgh’s one black player and even allowed the university to sell its share of
tickets on a nonsegregated basis. When Georgia Governor Marvin Griffin
attempted to bar Georgia Tech from participating in the “integrated” game, the
University System of Georgia’s Board of Regents upheld Tech’s Sugar Bowl
bid but agreed to bar all future participation by state-supported schools in inte-
grated sporting events.19
Conservative Sugar Bowl backers raised no organized outcry against the
mixed sports ban until it was essentially too late. After both houses of the Loui-
siana legislature voted to bar interracial sporting events, however, the MWSA
made a frenzied effort to persuade Governor Earl K. Long to veto the bill. Like
his brother Huey, Earl relished any opportunity to stick it to the Crescent City.
The bowl leaders noted that the stands had always been segregated according
to custom and needed no help from the state. They urged Long to give “serious
consideration” to the bill’s effect on the state economy, but the governor signed
the measure.20 The chamber of commerce also failed to provide any voice of
moderation that might have countered the racist maneuvers of Baton Rouge
politicians. Beset by internal disagreement, the chamber failed to take an offi-
cial stance on the issue. After affirming his belief in segregation, New Orleans
Hotel Association president E. Lysle Aschaffenburg told fellow chamber
members that New Orleans should show some respect for how the rest of the
nation saw the race issue, if only to salvage the city’s tourist economy.
Reminding his colleagues that the U.S. Naval Academy had already cancelled
its football game against Tulane, Aschaffenburg urged them to write Governor
Long in lieu of an apparently unlikely unified chamber response.21 In the wake
of the statute’s passage, Sugar Bowl officials allocated a paltry seventy-five
seats to African Americans in the eighty-two-thousand-seat Tulane Stadium.
The MWSA’s sluggish response to the quickening of racial proscription in
Louisiana reflected the long-standing social and economic conservatism of the
city’s blue bloods.22 Whites and blacks had historically lived in close proximity
to one another in New Orleans. The checkerboard residential pattern resulted
from the confinement of development to the narrow stretch of high ground near
the river as well as from a gradual subdivision of plantations and estates in the
nineteenth century. Slaves’ and servants’ quarters had stood very close to the
homes of the city’s elite, and the two races continued to live near each other
well into the twentieth century. In the absence of physical separation by race
and class, prominent New Orleans families carved out a realm of privilege
revolving around preferred schools, churches, social clubs, and especially Car-
nival organizations. Cloistered in mansions surrounded by manicured lawns
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on oak- and palm-lined boulevards in the city’s Uptown section, the Carnival
elite were comfortable with fortunes amassed by their ancestors in shipping,
freight forwarding, cotton brokering, warehousing, and plantation agriculture.
Many had by the twentieth century moved into key positions of influence in
law and high finance and formed an interlocking directorate on the boards of
such powerful entities as Whitney National Bank, New Orleans Public Ser-
vice, Inc., the New Orleans Dock Board, and the chamber of commerce. From
their lofty perch, these men exercised an inordinate degree of control over the
city’s economic direction. With the exception of a handful of civic-minded and
progressive individuals such as Darwin S. Fenner, president of the local
Merrill-Lynch brokerage, and Richard W. Freeman, president of the local
Coca-Cola Bottling Company, most of the old elite quietly supported the con-
servation of their own static, privileged position in New Orleans society.
Into the leadership void left by a generally complacent, self-satisfied elite
rushed those New Orleanians who had little stake in integrating their city into
the national economy. Such men often belonged to the Citizens’ Council of
Greater New Orleans, an outspoken branch of the segregationist Jackson, Mis-
sissippi–based Citizens’ Councils of America that exerted considerable pres-
sure against racial progress as late as the early 1960s. This umbrella
organization had sprung from the original Citizens’Council, formed in 1955 in
Sunflower County, Mississippi, as a vehicle of massive resistance to the Brown
decision. In New Orleans, the Citizens’ Council strongholds lay in the city’s
newer middle-class districts such as Metairie. Lakeview, and Gentilly that had
risen from the drained swampland abutting Lake Pontchartrain. The Citizens’
Council strove to influence municipal government officials, who were torn
between maintaining racial customs and opening the city to national influ-
ences.23
TRADITION VERSUS IMAGE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE
While more moderate municipal and business leaders already understood
that New Orleans could not retain a nineteenth-century racial order and still
fulfill its aspirations to expand commercial activity and the tourist trade, only
gradually did they begin to invoke a protourism, probusiness rhetoric in oppo-
sition to the more rabid white supremacy manifested by the Citizens’Council.
A series of events in the 1960s slowly galvanized an unlikely coalition of black
civil rights leaders, city officials, tourism interests, exceptional members of the
old elite, and a rising, restless business class drawn from outside the old estab-
lishment.24
In the postwar years, a burgeoning international tourist trade suddenly made
it essential to work to maintain New Orleans’s enviable position in the face of
rapidly growing competition. As the American racial climate transformed in
the postwar decades, it became increasingly important to embrace change to
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avoid being labeled backward. The events of the 1960s unfolded in an increas-
ingly tourism-conscious milieu in New Orleans, one that affected the com-
plexion of the race issue.25
On November 14, 1960, as little Ruby Bridges walked to the William Frantz
School, one of the two initial New Orleans schools chosen for token integra-
tion, angry white women, some holding small children, spewed invectives and
hurled rotten eggs. The white crowd, whom local writer Harnett T. Kane seem-
ingly hoped came from rural Mississippi rather than his beloved New Orleans,
shouted, “Two, four, six, eight, we don’t want to integrate!” and “Glory, glory,
segregation” to the tune of the Battle Hymn of the Republic. Although New
Orleans police arrived by midmorning, they made no concerted effort to dis-
perse the hate-filled mob.26 Day after day, the jeering and occasional violence
persisted.
As the days became shorter with the onset of another mild South Louisiana
winter, it became apparent that the city’s people were of several minds regard-
ing the disorder. The city’s old elite, including its unofficial mouthpiece, the
Times-Picayune, provided little direction. As corporate attorney Harry B.
Kelleher later recalled, the New Orleans uptown Carnival establishment
remained mostly silent as a segregationist governor and legislature in Baton
Rouge and a recalcitrant local Citizens’ Council dominated white discourse.27
Leander Perez, the ruthless political caudillo who in effect ruled neighboring
Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes as kingdoms of white supremacy, pro-
vided a stark contrast to New Orleans’s carefully cultivated image as a permis-
sive, tolerant, fun-loving, European-minded city. While more responsible
leaders kept silent, Perez struck fear into a dutiful, prosegregation crowd, esti-
mated between sixty-five hundred and eight thousand, that assembled in the
city-owned Municipal Auditorium on November 15. Following a skit in which
several white children—some in blackface—kissed and hugged each other to
suggest the interracial trysts that were sure to follow integration, Perez raised
the crowd to a fever pitch when he bellowed, “Don’t wait for your daughter to
be raped by these Congolese. Don’t wait until the burr-heads are forced into
your schools. Do something now!” The next day a mob of some two thousand
white youths roamed the downtown streets, attacking blacks and throwing bot-
tles, forcing the fire department to turn fire hoses on them and leading to about
two hundred arrests.28
However, those New Orleanians with interests inextricably tied to the city’s
favorable national image, including Mayor Morrison, tourism leaders, and
some other observant business leaders, began to see the maintenance of law
and order as more critical than upholding racial apartheid. They feared that the
Crescent City would become another Little Rock in the national mind. Follow-
ing the street violence, Morrison appeared on television and warned that riot-
ing would kill New Orleans’s reputation.29 Indeed, New Orleans received
horrendous publicity in the two months following “D-Day.” Time, Life,
Newsweek, the New York Times, major television networks, the wire services,
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and a host of other national media descended upon the city, which, one
observer said, with a considerable dose of hyperbole, appeared ripe for some-
thing on the order of a “South American revolution.”30 Morrison called the
national press outside agitators and even accused them of staging the ongoing
standoff outside the Frantz School. The mayor made a personal appeal to a vis-
iting New York Times correspondent to call for a moratorium on unfavorable
press coverage of the Crescent City because it created the “impression” that
“New Orleans is a sea of turmoil and violence.” He complained that the city
was “suffering completely without fault on our part” and claimed to have
received more than one thousand letters and telegrams about the situation, of
which “no more than one dozen are unfavorable.”31
Contrary to Morrison’s claims, numerous angry letters from around the
United States and Canada flooded the mayor’s office in November and
December 1960. A number of would-be tourists claimed they had reconsid-
ered their plans to visit the city, some out of fear and others out of indignation.
One Missouri physician wrote that never again would he vote that a medical
convention be held in New Orleans.32 A number of writers called attention to
the disparity between the city’s gracious image and the reality of pervasive big-
otry.33 Others wrote that New Orleans’s brutal excesses would become fodder
for Soviet and Cuban propaganda mills.34 In Morrison’s form letter response to
the letters his office received, he emphasized that fewer than 100 of the city’s
627,525 residents had taken part in the hostility, but clearly their actions
reflected a much more widespread mentality.35
A few responsible voices made themselves heard over the strident chorus of
intolerance. On December 14, 105 leading business and professional men
signed a full-page advertisement in the Times-Picayune calling for a change in
local attitudes toward integration. Tellingly, only Darwin S. Fenner and a very
few others from the city’s Carnival elite signed the manifesto. A week later, the
Greater New Orleans Tourist and Convention Commission issued a statement
that urged restraint and care to safeguard the economic benefits of tourism.36
The ample publicity produced direct, negative consequences for New
Orleans. The hotel and restaurant trade reflected the national backlash, with
November sales tumbling more than 30 percent below those of the previous
November. Maison Blanche department store on Canal Street reported a nearly
40 percent drop, and even Bourbon Street business and taxicab fares sagged.
During the week preceding the Sugar Bowl game, a number of French Quarter
restaurants reported empty tables, and hotels still had vacancies.37 One swamp
tour operator warned that the tourism business was suffering and noted that he
had heard a national radio bulletin urging that Mardi Gras visitors exercise
caution because a minor incident could trigger a “bloody race riot.”38 As Mardi
Gras neared, Morrison penned a letter to the editor of the New York Herald Tri-
bune in which he promised that visitors would find New Orleans the same “tra-
ditionally hospitable, courteous and charming city,” but the celebration that
followed appeared muted in comparison with previous years.39 The ill effects
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of the school crisis lingered through 1961. One prominent New Orleans hote-
lier told Victor Schiro, Morrison’s protégé and successor as mayor, that during
his extensive travels in the summer of 1961, he detected a sea change in atti-
tudes toward the city. Whereas in the past the mere mention of New Orleans
“worked like magic,” he wrote, “now I find that everywhere I go I am on the
defensive and the great image that New Orleans projected everywhere has cer-
tainly been badly hurt.”40
After a tidal wave of negative publicity surrounding the school desegrega-
tion crisis in the fall of 1960, municipal leaders became very protective of the
city’s wounded urbane image. Indeed, the bitter memory of the school crisis
remained fresh in their minds for years. When NBC’s TODAY show contacted
the chamber of commerce in 1963 about its plans to film a week’s worth of pro-
grams in New Orleans during the Mardi Gras celebration, New Orleans busi-
ness leaders expressed mixed feelings. The editor of the Times-Picayune
remarked to the chamber president,
You may remember that in 1960 NBC covered the “demonstrations” when sev-
eral schools were desegregated in a way which some of our citizens considered
gave a distorted picture of the real situation in New Orleans and seriously dam-
aged the good name of the city.
He suggested that the chamber should think twice before offering any assis-
tance to TODAY.41
The chamber understood that the television program also had the potential
to encourage would-be tourists to visit New Orleans. The example of Key
West, Florida, remained fresh in officials’ minds. One month earlier, in the
midst of the Cuban missile crisis, the Florida Keys appeared destined for one of
its worst tourist seasons. After TODAY broadcast from Key West, with the
close assistance of the chamber of commerce, municipal and state leaders, and
the Florida Development Commission, the town enjoyed a sudden resurgence
of tourist interest.42 Accordingly, the New Orleans chamber embraced the
show and implored NBC producers to focus on the city “from a business and
tourist standpoint” and to avoid any mention of the racial situation. It allocated
to NBC thirty thousand dollars raised from members, local utilities, downtown
merchants, and tourist businesses.43
The careful, behind-the-scenes negotiations between the city’s establish-
ment leaders and NBC producers to portray New Orleans as the city of Carni-
val, food and music, French heritage, and gracious Old South homes did not sit
well with African American civil rights activists. Black leaders learned to
employ a rhetoric of tourism in their efforts to end segregation in New Orleans.
One wrote TODAY anchor Hugh Downs, deploring the show’s neglect of the
Crescent City’s jazz tradition and reminding him that blacks could not join
whites in the city’s leading restaurants, hotels, movie theaters, and Carnival
balls. “Are you aware,” he inquired,
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that the Today program is being used as part of the Great Whitewash of the
South; that it is being used to propagandize the Great Myth of New Orleans as a
Cosmopolitan City when actually it is a city with a wall separating freedom and
liberty from tyranny and despotism which is thicker and higher than the Berlin
Wall?44
Amid the wrangling over the city’s image in the three years after the school
crisis, civil rights activists busied themselves struggling to erase the color line
in other public accommodations. Although much of this activism initially
focused on lunch counters, these early struggles helped set up an atmosphere
of impatience with the status quo that led to subsequent efforts to desegregate
more tourist-oriented facilities. More immediately, they also led both sides to
claim, for different reasons, that the sit-ins would damage the local tourist
trade. Following the student sit-in demonstrations in Greensboro, North
Carolina’s downtown lunch counters, collegians staged the first New Orleans
sit-in on September 9, 1960, at F. W. Woolworth at the corner of Canal and
Rampart streets in one corner of the French Quarter. Two of the seven protest-
ers were white, all were members of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE),
and all either were or had been students at Dillard University, Louisiana State
University of New Orleans, Southern University, or Tulane University. After
police arrested the students for criminal mischief, another contingent of four
expanded the sit-ins to McCrory’s five-and-dime store the following day.45 The
sit-ins continued intermittently, and by the end of the following year, store
managers had grown very confrontational. At McCrory’s, employees dumped
mustard, grease, ammonia, and even chocolate all over the counter where the
students sat quietly awaiting service. Store-hired thugs even poured unknown
solvents over the heads of some demonstrators and burned one activist’s
CORE cap, while the manager waved a pistol and shouted obscenities.46
White reaction to the lunch counter sit-ins in New Orleans did not yet
exhibit the rift that became apparent within a couple of years between those
who held a stake in the national economy and those who could afford to adhere
to prevailing Southern opinion. The Citizens’ Council, as usual, provided the
shrillest cries against change. Its members vowed to boycott any business that
integrated its eating facilities and increase patronage of those that upheld Jim
Crow. One of the organization’s leaders announced that its members would
stage a “paper-bag brigade” by bringing sack lunches in lieu of ordering food
at the lunch counters.47 The Greater New Orleans Citizens’Council even initi-
ated what became known as the “Freedom Rides North” movement, a perverse
imitation of CORE’s “freedom rides” in which Citizens’ Councils in several
Southern cities (including Shreveport, Louisiana; Montgomery, Alabama; and
Macon, Georgia) offered to buy one-way bus tickets to any Northern city for
indigent African Americans who felt unwanted in the South. Although the pro-
ject probably transported fewer than 250 blacks out of the South, it symbolized
the complete disregard of a considerable segment of the city’s white popula-
tion for black economic power and the benefits to be gained by aligning New
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Orleans’s practices with national ways. And it affixed the ugly emblem of big-
otry on the “Paris of the South” in the national eye.48 WDSU-TV, owned by the
liberal-minded Jewish civic leader Edgar B. Stern and a rare voice of responsi-
bility in the local media, berated the idea of “a small band of extremists who are
attempting to drag Louisiana back to the 19th century.”49
Another weapon in the Citizens’ Council’s arsenal was issuing dire warn-
ings that racial mixing would harm the Crescent City’s tourist economy. The
idea that segregation threatened tourism had not yet taken root among the
city’s municipal and business establishment. If the school crisis of fall 1960
had pointed to the impact that Jim Crow could have on tourism, that fear cen-
tered not upon segregation itself but instead on the prospect of civil disorder.
The same mentality continued during the sit-in movement, as chamber of com-
merce officials bemoaned the bad publicity the city received while thousands
of tourists were in town for the Sugar Bowl and considered developing some
modus operandi for coaxing the press toward stories that depicted the city’s
“progress.”50 Until city leaders began to view segregation as an impediment to
the city’s nationalization, white supremacists would continue to find an audi-
ence for the notion that Southern indignation made integration bad business. In
the midst of the lunch counter sit-ins, Shelby Gillis, a board member of the
New Orleans branch of the Citizens’ Council, warned that desegregation
would create a “great big monster.” He told fellow Citizens’Council members
that he fully expected blacks to target the city’s famed restaurants once they
had forced their way into downtown lunch counters. As soon as that happened,
he predicted, tourism would decline.51
At the request of the NAACP, dominated locally by the city’s influential but
hardly militant light-skinned creoles of African American descent, CORE
agreed reluctantly to suspend sit-ins in favor of negotiations with white mer-
chants beginning in March 1962.52 After exactly two years of hard-fought cam-
paigns against Canal Street merchants, the New Orleans branch of the NAACP
successfully negotiated a settlement with the storeowners, and on September
11, 1962, almost exactly two years after the sit-ins began, some forty stores,
including Katz and Besthoff (K&B) drugstores, D. H. Holmes and Maison
Blanche department stores, and Woolworth’s and McCrory’s five-and-dime
stores, opened their lunch counters to blacks.53
With the city’s leading downtown lunch counters desegregated, attention
turned to hotels. As late as 1963, the small but powerful New Orleans down-
town hotel oligarchy dominated by Seymour Weiss exercised no leadership in
helping the Crescent City adapt to evolving national standards. Unwilling to
temper his prosegregation attitude, Weiss told the chamber of commerce that
New Orleans’s loss of considerable convention business as a result of racial
discrimination made it essential that the business community concentrate on
attracting more all-white convention groups to the city. In a press interview,
he added, “I’m not advocating any change. I’m merely stating the facts as a
realist.”54
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New Orleans’s effort to attract a National Football League (NFL) expansion
team required that the city demonstrate that it could handle players, press,
staff, and spectators without regard to race. The NFL remained primarily a
northern and western league even in the 1960s. No blacks played in the NFL
from 1933 to 1946. The formation in 1944 of two leagues that accepted
blacks—the United States Football League (USFL) and the All-America Foot-
ball Conference (AAFC)—exerted great pressure on the NFL to drop its racial
barrier. Miami, Florida, once said to be the most “nazified [sic] of all the cities
in the world on matters of racial equality,” proved it could handle biracial
sports when it started the Seahawks, an AAFC franchise, in 1946.55 A dozen
years later, Houston, Texas, began pursuing a major league baseball team and
found that the demands of professional sports necessitated easing Jim Crow
restrictions. To win the support of black voters, whose backing was crucial to
pass a second bond issue for a state-of-the-art domed stadium plagued by cost
overruns, Houston’s mayor, Roy Hofheinz, and oil and real estate magnate
R. E. Smith negotiated a deal with black leaders to open the facility on an inte-
grated basis in return for their assistance in drumming up black support. The
dome integration opened the way for the desegregation of other accommoda-
tions, for it quickly became apparent that Houston’s leading downtown hotels
would need to accept black athletes as guests. Mayor Hofheinz worked with
John T. Jones, whose syndicate owned four of Houston’s leading convention
hotels. Jones not only agreed to desegregate but also brought pressure to bear
upon other hoteliers, who also integrated in April 1962 in time for the first Colt
.45s (later the Astros) game.56
If the promise of professional sports brought the smooth integration of
Houston’s public accommodations, it did not work the same magic in the Cres-
cent City, where the realization of open access to tourist facilities proved much
more gradual and contentious. The domination of the hotel market by a few old
establishments, especially the Roosevelt, whose restaurants, parlors, and
cocktail lounges had built a stable, loyal clientele of white southerners and
local uptown luminaries, made it exceedingly difficult to persuade hoteliers of
the potential for future losses if they did not open their properties to all peo-
ple.57 One city official warned Mayor Morrison in 1959 that New Orleans
needed “more tourist spectator attractions—the road to which is narrowed, if
not blocked by the racial law.” He added,
We have champion fighters that have to either fight out of their class here or go
out of town. We can’t have Major League baseball games, because every Major
League baseball club has Negro players. . . . I have just come back from a base-
ball excursion to Florida where I saw three good games. . . . I saw jai-alai in the
Miami Fronton and passed up three dog tracks[,] all of which are doing good
business. . . . So, at the moment, I question that it is timely for New Orleans to
spend a lot of money, trying to attract tourists in competition with places like
Miami . . . until we have more to offer. We are getting the added hotel rooms—
now we have to change a law, and then build additional attractions.58
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In the Crescent City, even sporting events remained segregated one year after
rival Houston had integrated both its baseball stadium and its leading hotels.
In 1963, David F. Dixon, a forty-year-old businessman, decided that a pro-
fessional sports team would confer big-league status on New Orleans, which
was by that time sagging economically despite its Sunbelt ambitions. Dixon
understood well the potential damage that segregation and bigotry could inflict
on New Orleans’s football hopes. Dixon’s effort grew out of a 1962 American
Football League (AFL) exhibition game organized by Jack DeFee and other
business leaders and held in City Park Stadium. At that game, which featured
the Houston Oilers and the New England Patriots, state regulations confined
African American spectators to a small section. Despite the appearance of
Billy Cannon, a Heisman winner from Louisiana State University who had
signed with the Oilers, attendance proved lackluster.59
Believing that New Orleans should attempt to attract an NFL franchise
instead, the following year Dixon hired public relations guru David M. Kleck,
who suggested that a fully integrated double-header exhibition game played in
the prestigious Tulane Stadium would be the best way to curry favor with the
NFL. Dixon understood that Tulane would be thwarting the state statute ban-
ning all interracial sporting venues. Fearing possible embarrassment to the
university and to the city should an ugly racial incident result, Dixon decided to
try to get the mixed sports law repealed. After failing to impress upon white
attorneys the need to overturn the statute, Dixon and Kleck met with seventy-
five black leaders at Peter Claver Hall on Orleans Avenue, including thirty-
four-year-old attorney Ernest N. (“Dutch”) Morial, an NAACP field secretary
and one of the city’s most prominent creole leaders. The black leaders were
sympathetic but told Dixon they had other priorities. Dixon recalled later that
he had eight thousand dollars cash with him that day, and when Morial said he
might speed up the process for a two thousand dollar fee, Dixon said he would
have to think about it. Wishing to avoid Morial’s knowing he had been pre-
pared to pay four times that amount, Dixon retired to a restroom, where he
carefully separated two thousand dollars into another pocket of his suit. He
returned a few minutes later and paid Morial his requested fee. Morial filed suit
in federal district court, resulting in the repeal of the mixed seating ban within
three months.60
Dixon next had to convince Tulane University’s board of administrators to
allow the game in the school’s stadium. He got William Ford, owner of the
Detroit Lions football team, to write a letter to the board, asking them to inte-
grate their stadium and noting that the Ford Foundation—a major source of
funding for institutions of higher learning—would look favorably on such an
act. The board appeared unlikely to consent until Joseph Merrick Jones and
Darwin Fenner stepped forward and suggested that New Orleans would be
hopelessly mired in provincialism unless civic leaders took positive steps on
the race issue, whereupon the board agreed to sell all tickets on a non-
segregated basis. As with other integration coups in public accommodations,
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no one announced the decision, but news traveled by word of mouth. The dou-
ble-header, which pitted the Dallas Cowboys against the Detroit Lions and the
Baltimore Colts against the Chicago Bears, was perhaps the most integrated
professional football game ever held before or since in the South, with more
than 30 percent black attendance. The only tense moments came when a sud-
den thunderstorm sent fans running for cover beneath the stands. Dixon later
recalled,
I had a vision of blacks and whites hammering each other under that overhang,
the media reports that would result, the end of my dreams of an NFL fran-
chise. . . . I was so scared I was shaking and I rushed down from the press box to
try and stop the carnage. But when I got there, everyone was laughing. They
were brought together by their discomfort.
With the city’s primary sports venue integrated, the problem of hotels
remained to be solved.61
The pressure of courting the NFL and the ongoing loss of national conven-
tions to more open cities, coupled with increasingly insistent demands from
the city’s black activists and even creole elites, began to effect a change in
some of New Orleans’s more farsighted white leaders. By 1962, Houston, Dal-
las, and Miami had succeeded in opening their leading convention hotels to
blacks, yet Atlanta and New Orleans establishments remained as wholly
“unreconstructed” as their counterparts in small Southern towns far removed
from the well-worn paths of convention bookings. Three events in particular—
two lawsuits against downtown hotels and the loss of one of the nation’s most
coveted conventions—speeded the push for discrimination-free hotels in New
Orleans.
In the early 1960s, a loose biracial coalition of leaders began urging the inte-
gration of downtown hotels. Creole leaders like Dutch Morial, podiatrist and
travel agent Leonard L. Burns, NAACP official Arthur J. Chapital Sr., and
Urban League officer Harry Kerns joined Pepsi-Cola Bottling executive and
tourist commission president Harry M. England in trying to negotiate an
agreement with hoteliers. Burns later recalled speaking with Seymour Weiss,
who growled that the Roosevelt would never integrate. Working closely with
New Orleans black leaders, Little Rock civil rights activist Daisy Bates
attempted in late 1962 to check into the Roosevelt and was told the hotel could
not honor the reservations of African Americans. Hiding behind a pillar in the
lobby, Burns and Morial overheard the hotel clerk’s response, whereupon
Morial set out to draft a lawsuit.62
Heeding a directive from Washington, D.C., Burns and other leaders
decided it might prove more fruitful to delay forcing Weiss’s hand and instead
exert pressure on New Orleans’s few hotels affiliated with national chains,
which they reasoned could not afford risking their good name.63 Daisy Bates
next tried to register at the Sheraton-Charles Hotel (formerly the St. Charles),
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which also refused her on racial grounds. Morial and other NAACP attorneys
soon brought suit against the hotel’s parent company, the Sheraton Corpora-
tion in New Jersey. Meanwhile, James T. McCain of Sumter, South Carolina, a
prominent CORE official, failed to secure a room in the Royal Orleans Hotel in
the French Quarter, leading to a separate lawsuit by CORE and the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).64 The conservative Times-Picayune remained
silent on hotel segregation until May 1963, when federal judges John Minor
Wisdom, Herbert W. Christenberry, and E. Gordon West, considering the cases
together, ruled the Louisiana law unconstitutional in McCain v. Davis. At first
glance a breakthrough, in fact the courts had no jurisdiction over the hotels,
leaving the decision whether to integrate up to hotel management.65
New Orleans anticipated the arrival of some sixty thousand visitors that
September for the American Legion national convention. It was to be the city’s
first hosting of the convention since 1922. In the spring of 1963, convention
planners announced they were considering moving the event elsewhere
because of concerns that New Orleans hotels might not accommodate black
delegates.66 Creole civil rights leader Arthur Chapital called on the local Amer-
ican Legion host committee to demand equal treatment of blacks in the city’s
hotels. Rather than pointing to the demoralizing effect of the accommodations
bar against blacks, Chapital invoked a protourism rhetoric, declaring, “We
believe that a sincere policy of democracy in action and true [C]hristian fellow-
ship would not only enhance tourism and the image of New Orleans and the
American Legion but would benefit the economy of this area.”67
If New Orleans black leaders were learning to enlist the city’s tourist image
in their fight for racial equality, white business leaders remained of two minds
on whether to sacrifice a generations-old social custom for the economic lift
that would accompany the legionnaires for one week in the “City that Care For-
got.” Symptomatic of the city’s leadership vacuum, no one stepped forward to
assure the legionnaires that local hotels would welcome all of them uncondi-
tionally. At a chamber of commerce meeting in late April, Joseph W. Simon Jr.,
president of the chamber, reported having had a telephone conversation con-
cerning the possibility that the Legion might withdraw from the city, but appar-
ently he did little or nothing in response.68 The federal court ruling in McCain v.
Davis destroyed whatever chances New Orleans had of retaining the conven-
tion. Although the court ruled that the 1956 statute forbidding integration of
Louisiana hotels and motels was unconstitutional, it implied that it would not
enforce hotel desegregation. Despite chamber of commerce discussion of the
imperiled convention as well as ample local press coverage, Mayor Schiro
expressed surprise but demonstrated remarkably little concern. “Of course,”
he added, “the management of our hotels is still a matter of private enterprise
and owners of these have their rights.”69
By the spring of 1963, the slow pace of change accompanying the negotia-
tion strategy of more conservative black and creole leaders incensed CORE
members. Pointing to the ongoing problems with lunch counters that were
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nominally integrated but often segregated in practice, New Orleans CORE
chairman Oretha Castle expressed doubt that negotiations alone could bring
true racial integration. In June, she demanded the desegregation of all facilities
in municipal buildings within ten days as well as the lifting of the racial bar in
hotels, restaurants, and theaters within thirty days, or “we will initiate mass
demonstrations in the City of New Orleans.”70 Although the resumption of
demonstrations in the summer focused once again on lunch counters and
municipal facilities rather than hotels and other accommodations, perceptive
hotel operators, if not city hall, could see that change needed to come quickly.71
The cumulative effect of numerous CORE threats, convention cancella-
tions, the court’s ruling against hotel segregation, and the crushing blow dealt
by the American Legion persuaded the operators of three downtown hotels to
announce they would integrate on September 10, 1963. The Sheraton Corpora-
tion and the Hotel Corporation of America, operators of the Sheraton-Charles
and the Royal Orleans, respectively, ordered their New Orleans establishments
to integrate. Likewise, Arthur Jung broke ranks with the city’s leading locally
owned hotels and desegregated the Jung Hotel, then in the midst of an expan-
sion that would make it the largest convention hotel in the Crescent City.
Although the desegregation of three leading hotels represented a giant step for-
ward in New Orleans, the hotels still had to abide by a city ordinance that for-
bade racial mixing in establishments that served alcohol unless they divided
their service area with a partition. Thus, for the time being, a hungry African
American guest had to venture outside the hotel or order room service. As with
the federal court’s ruling earlier that year, the Times-Picayune studiously
avoided any commentary on the watershed event.72
Other leading downtown hotels, including the Roosevelt and the
Monteleone, remained committed to segregation. The Roosevelt had built a
loyal clientele, especially among southerners, while the Monteleone contin-
ued its position as the dominant tourist hotel in the French Quarter. Seymour
Weiss did not flinch when the U.S. Department of Defense prohibited active-
duty military personnel from participating in sessions of the Adjutants General
Association of the United States at the Roosevelt in April 1964. Weiss’s hotel
had refused to accommodate Colonel Otho Van Exel, a black delegate from
Brooklyn. New York Governor Nelson D. Rockefeller ordered the New York
delegation home from New Orleans. Scarcely two weeks later, CORE pressure
persuaded the Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference to abandon the
Roosevelt for the Jung. Weiss seemed indifferent: “There is a Civil Rights law
pending in Washington now. Until it is passed and there is a law that says I must
integrate my hotel, I will continue our policy.”73
On July 4, 1964, the Times-Picayune reported near-total compliance with
the Civil Rights Act passed one day earlier. The famous Café du Monde coffee
stand in the French Market, along with leading French Quarter restaurants,
served its first black patrons.74 African Americans doubtless approached their
newly won freedoms with considerable circumspection. Old habits died hard,
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and few blacks ventured into the French Quarter, which they considered a
white attraction. Bourbon Street establishments reported business as usual. A
waitress at the Paddock Restaurant said she knew of no blacks seeking service
in the first week after the enactment of the measure.75
Although most establishments in the French Quarter and Central Business
District complied with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, New Orleans faced
embarrassing compliance problems elsewhere. The local branch of the
NAACP filed complaints against the Frostop drive-in hamburger stand chain
and Lee’s Hamburgers on Tulane Avenue in Mid-City, which continued to dis-
play a “This Window for Colored Only” sign.76 Likewise, Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Supermarkets, the city’s dominant (and locally owned) grocery chain,
resisted change. CORE testers were denied service repeatedly at
Schwegmann’s lunch counters that summer. While John G. Schwegmann Jr.
occasionally promoted the gigantic Gentilly Road store, billed the “World’s
Largest Supermarket,” as a tourist attraction in the local press, he understood
clearly that his suburban stores drew primarily local whites. In support of
Schwegmann’s dogged determination to resist integration, the Citizens’Coun-
cil took out a large ad in the States-Item that urged white patrons to shop the
supermarkets and “show these Negroes who really runs the economy.”77
As long as overt discrimination retreated to “back-of-town” neighborhood
restaurants and bars, out of sight of visiting conventioneers and tourists, city
leaders could claim that New Orleans was on a march to greatness. When prej-
udice appeared in the city’s “front yard,” however, officials began to fret. On
the mild winter night of January 10, 1965, Tulane Stadium stood empty, await-
ing a torrent of fans for the AFL all-star game, an exhibition that Dave Dixon
had lured to New Orleans to benefit the New Orleans Police Foundation and,
more important, to reinforce the city’s claim to the NFL that it had eliminated
all racial barriers. Across town, Clem Daniels, a standout black player for the
Oakland Raiders, stood with some teammates outside the Roosevelt Hotel,
waiting for a taxi to the French Quarter. Although six cabs had lined up along
University Place, the street that runs in front of the hotel, the drivers all left
their cars to avoid serving the black players. After much frustration, Daniels
recalled, “Finally, we stood in the middle of the street and a cab stopped rather
than run us down.” Upon reaching the famed Bourbon Street, Daniels and his
friends found themselves mocked, insulted, and turned away by bouncers. To
be sure, Al Hirt’s and Pete Fountain’s jazz clubs extended a warm welcome to
the all-star players. Unlike the seedy Bourbon Street striptease clubs that could
rely on the steady patronage of locals, seamen, and men seeking escape from
the sexually repressed Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana hinterlands, Hirt
and Fountain sought to provide first-rate entertainment for more discriminat-
ing tourists. The African American players had an even more difficult time
hailing a taxicab back to their hotel. Only one driver even stopped, and he
averred that he could not risk arrest for transporting the men several blocks
through the heart of the city. The players ended up asking directions and
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walking back to the hotel. After hearing the complaints of the twenty-one
affected black athletes, the AFL shifted the game to Houston.78
Mayor Schiro deplored the football player walkout, which could not have
come at a worse time. The New Orleans Pro Football Club was just then
ardently courting one of two proposed NFL expansion teams. Dave Dixon
expressed dismay at the unfortunate incident and commented that a taxicab
driver had given his friend, a San Diego sports writer, a “filthy piece of litera-
ture discussing mixed marriages and sordid relations between the races.”
Dixon added, “You can imagine the impression that this would make on a visi-
tor to our city.”79 Seemingly more concerned with stopping the bleeding than
with remedying the underlying problems, the mayor argued that the black
players “should have rolled with the punch. Almost all of them,” he added, “are
educated college men who must be aware that you cannot change human
nature overnight.” Schiro remarked that “they have done themselves and their
race a disservice.”80 Convinced that the whole incident was the dirty work of
outside agitators “on a mission,” Schiro refused to admit publicly that even if
laws could not guarantee equal treatment, they could go a long way toward dis-
mantling a century of increasingly resolute bigotry among some southerners.81
Echoing Schiro, WWL-TV sports editor Hap Glaudi decried the breach of
contract and questioned why the “mutinous Negro players” were going to
Bourbon Street strip clubs in the first place. Losing sight of the fundamental
issue of insidious racial barriers in one of America’s most popular sporting
events, Glaudi argued that the AFL had “made a binding contract to play a
football game here on January 16th . . . not to conduct a social function.” Fur-
thermore, Glaudi ranted, the only reason the previous year’s Sugar Bowl game
had passed without incident was “because the Sugar Bowl people recognized it
wasn’t wise to permit the Syracuse Negro players to wander aimlessly around
our town” and had taken them aside and explained where they would and
would not be welcomed.82
The AFL debacle and Schiro’s feeble efforts to justify the glacial pace of
desegregation in New Orleans, even after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, elicited a flood of editorial reactions and correspondence from around
the country. One Kansas City man noted that New Orleans’s “image at one
time was that of a city of warm-blooded, fun loving, joyous and happy people,”
but now “prejudice and bigotry have poisoned the place.”83 Another Kansas
City visitor, an African American, went to the Crescent City around the time of
the AFL walkout and reported facing racially motivated mistreatment. As he
stood on Canal Street during a downpour, several taxicabs drove past him to
collect white patrons just a few feet away. On another occasion, a clerk refused
to sell him a ticket for a Gray Line sightseeing bus tour. A Gray Line porter
advised that tours for blacks needed to be “prearranged,” but even then the
company usually denied blacks tickets with a series of carefully worded
excuses.84 Some would-be tourists, appalled by city hall’s callous stance
toward the players, vowed to stay away from New Orleans. An African
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American man from Schenectady, New York, stationed at Jackson Barracks in
New Orleans during World War II, wrote that he had liked the city very much
but now felt no desire to return because of the worsening racial climate. He
suggested that the untold tourist losses should prompt the mayor to spearhead
the education of citizens, who “will let a Negro mind [his] children and cook
[his] food” yet would not dream of sharing public accommodations.85 At least
one major national convention, that of the American Chemical Society,
expressed serious reservations about the advisability of holding a future meet-
ing in the Crescent City.86
A Boston Globe columnist summed up the thoughts of many when he wrote
that no one visiting New Orleans should be forced to “roll with the punches.”
He observed that Schiro might be correct in saying that human nature could not
change overnight, but “in New Orleans, ‘overnight’ has extended about 100
years. . . . Why should [blacks] slink around town as second class citizens
while their presence in the game’s line-up brings profit to the cabbies and the
other white promoters?” He concluded that New Orleans did not deserve to
win a professional football team.87
White New Orleanians and other Louisianians exhibited a range of reac-
tions to the cancellation. As in the aftermath of the school desegregation crisis
four years earlier, local white opinion had a heavily segregationist slant. A
number of letters to city hall echoed Schiro’s allegation that the walkout was
premeditated under pressure from national civil rights activists.88 Others dis-
played a more virulent strain of racism. One New Orleanian charged that what
“these negroes really wanted was a chance to ogle white strippers.”89 Another
claimed that he and his friends had no intention of going to the game “to see
those negroes play our white boys” and were “glad that those black apes
walked out.”90
Not surprisingly, those whose livelihoods relied purely on local rather than
national connections tended to be among the more outspoken critics of the
AFL action. The editor of the Citizens’Report, the monthly publication of the
prosegregation, Metairie-based South Louisiana Citizens’ Council, saw no
need to compromise racist principles to lure a professional football team to
New Orleans. In a letter to the mayor, he wrote,
Don’t you realize that every time these interracial Gladiators come to New
Orleans they create a dangerous problem by insisting on sleeping in the same
hotels, eating in the same restaurants, attending the same night spots, and riding
in the same taxicabs as the white players?
Employing rhetoric that more squarely fit the Red Scare or McCarthy years, he
contended that the city had been “harassed long enough by leftwing pressure
groups, outside agitators, fifth columnists and assorted snoops.” Calling on the
mayor to return to the conservative, segregationist principles on which he ran
his 1962 mayoral campaign, the Citizens’Council leader implied the majority
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of white voters would forsake him in 1966 unless he mounted “a firm stand
against any idea of a pro-football league.”91
Reaction to the AFL incident even found its way into French Quarter enter-
tainment. Almost immediately after the league moved the game to Houston,
three young white actors staged a comic revue at the Original Absinthe House,
a popular tourist attraction and local hangout on Bourbon Street. The show, a
bitter parody on civil rights, took jabs at the Freedom Riders, Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr., and President Johnson. The act starred Billy Holliday, who one Los
Angeles reporter thought was, “perhaps, more opportunistic than bigoted. He
gives the people down there what they want, and he plays to packed houses
every night.” Holliday used the AFL incident in his routine:
When ’em ballplayers come to town, I tole the manager, if one wants to come in
heah, let him come and charge him 25 dollahs a drink. If he come back with a
friend, charge ’em 50 dollahs a drink. If ’at friend come back with a friend, we
charge ’em 75 dollahs. And, if they pay it, we kick all the white people out.92
While the city’s old-line white elite generally remained aloof from the con-
troversy in the manner befitting those who fancied themselves aristocrats, a
few white New Orleanians expressed sympathy for the black football players.
One Broadmoor woman recalled a recent taxicab ride during which her driver
snarled “Animal!” as a black driver passed him. When she asked him to repeat
what he had just said, the cabbie bellowed, “They are all animals.” The woman
suggested to Schiro that even the alleged improvement in race relations at the
1965 Sugar Bowl game between Syracuse and Louisiana State University
(LSU), the first integrated Sugar Bowl since 1956, fell far short of the mayor’s
glowing remarks. “Perhaps the Syracuse squad was well treated,” she allowed,
“but in the stands . . . L.S.U. rooters were hollering, ‘Get those nigger-lovers.’ ”93
Another New Orleanian considered it “not a matter of the AFL ‘acting hastily’
so much as New Orleans dragging its feet. . . . The AFL must compete for the
best players—is New Orleans willing to compete for the ‘big leagues?’ ”94
Fortunately for New Orleans professional football backers, by 1965 the
NFL was concerned principally with securing an exemption from federal anti-
trust laws. Louisiana’s senior congressional delegation, U.S. Senator Russell
B. Long and U.S. Representative Hale T. Boggs, promised the exemption in
return for the NFL’s commitment to New Orleans, and the New Orleans Saints
were born. Racial considerations appeared to melt away after the NFL had
observed several exhibition games playing to a full Tulane Stadium.95
Local civil rights activists seized the momentum generated by the AFL inci-
dent to press city hall to ameliorate racial separatism. Black civil rights attor-
ney Nils R. Douglas deplored the lack of courage exhibited by city leaders and
the press in the football scandal and noted that blacks did not share the prevail-
ing white notion that New Orleans enjoyed “racial harmony.”96 Many African
American leaders continued to employ a rhetoric of tourism to bolster their
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condemnation of the city’s unfortunate drift. In a statement before the New
Orleans City Council, the Reverend John Baringer, president of the Commu-
nity Relations Council, a Metairie-based nonpolitical, biracial association of
concerned business, religious, professional, and working citizens, urged quick
attention to salvage the city’s image. Calling for the creation of a municipal
human relations commission, Baringer reminded councilmen that “such
events as Mardi Gras, the International Jazz Festival and numerous national
conventions . . . will be jeopardized unless long overdue actions are taken.”97
F. Winter Trapolin, a black insurance broker and activist, reminded Schiro of a
letter he had sent the mayor in 1963 warning that “our cures so far have been
temporary each time the panic button was pushed.” In the wake of the AFL
fiasco, Trapolin urged the mayor to delay no longer in appointing a human
rights council, which “would go a long way in restoring our tarnished
image . . . [and] would show prospective industries and tourists, and our own
citizens, we know how to handle and to prevent such emergencies.”98 Only in
1967 did Schiro finally create the New Orleans Human Relations Committee
(HRC).
In the midst of the city’s effort to woo the NFL, New Orleans’s tourist image
continued to suffer one setback after another, belying Mayor Schiro’s conten-
tion that the AFL incident was an aberration in what was usually a cosmopoli-
tan, open city. Just days after the AFL players packed their bags for Houston,
three African Americans, including a Houstonian, failed to obtain service at
Castillo’s, a popular Mexican restaurant in the French Quarter. The next night,
police arrested two New Orleans NAACP leaders, Llewellyn Soniat and Wal-
ter Winston, for trespassing at the Jazz Corner nightclub at 1218 Canal Street
after the activists ignored the barmaid’s demand that they vacate the club.99
Black delegates to an AFL-CIO fund-raising dinner at the Roosevelt Hotel in
November 1965 found themselves inexplicably channeled to all-black
tables.100
Planners of national conventions continued to take such incidents very seri-
ously and sometimes pulled the plug on meetings already scheduled for New
Orleans. One month after the football fiasco, Seymour Weiss, a staunch segre-
gationist until compelled by federal law to play by national rules, suddenly
became an unlikely critic of taxicab segregation, a form of public accommoda-
tion not covered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Weiss complained to the
mayor that the National Labor Relations Board called to cancel its planned
meeting at the Roosevelt after learning of a black delegate to the recent Ameri-
can Bar Association convention who could not find a taxi to convey him from
the Fontainebleau Motor Hotel to the Roosevelt for the meetings.101 In June, a
black delegate of a national Methodist Church convention was refused taxi ser-
vice in New Orleans on several occasions.102 Other black tourists experienced
difficulty finding a taxicab just to go from Moisant International Airport to
their hotel in the city, sometimes having to pay more than the standard metered
fare.103
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Racial discrimination in New Orleans’s tourist businesses continued to hurt
the city’s image throughout the latter half of the 1960s. To be sure, the more
reputable businesses in the French Quarter generally served all customers
without regard to race, but Bourbon Street’s numerous nightclubs remained
highly popular attractions. Only gradually, in the 1970s and 1980s, would the
French Quarter become more oriented to Decatur Street and cater more to vis-
iting families. In the 1960s, as one tourism leader recalled, “You didn’t bring
your wife to New Orleans, and you certainly didn’t bring your kids.”104 Bour-
bon Street strip clubs such as the Circus Club, Silver Frolics, Chez Paree, Club
Hotsy Totsy, and Guys and Dolls, among others, continued to turn away blacks
frequently, which perhaps reflected lingering racist notions of African Ameri-
can men as sexual beasts apt to deflower white womanly virtue (even in the
form of an exotic dancer). Some of the clubs were known to quote higher cover
charges, prices, and drinking minimums to blacks than to whites.105 One group
of black tourists from Houston tried to order food at McConnell’s King of
Hamburgers on Bourbon Street and wound up arrested, allegedly for disturb-
ing the peace.106 Other establishments in or near the Quarter sometimes
charged blacks double for food and drink unless they opted for takeout or
refused to serve them altogether.107
Just as the 1963 cancellation of the American Legion convention helped
precipitate the first wave of hotel desegregation in New Orleans, pressure for a
local public accommodations ordinance became more pronounced by 1969 as
a string of convention incidents and cancellations plagued the city. Black dele-
gates at the mostly black Frontiers International convention at the Roosevelt
Hotel in July 1969 were informed they had entered a “private club” when they
tried to order drinks at the Jazz Corner on Canal Street and two other bars on
University Place across from the hotel. At the convention’s closing session, the
Frontiers delegates adopted a resolution calling for the city government to take
immediate steps or face a convention boycott. Such a boycott not only would
deny the city future Frontiers International meetings but also a host of other
conventions, for among the Frontiers members were the heads of several other
major organizations planning to hold conventions in New Orleans, each with
between three thousand and six thousand delegates.108
The delegates to the Head Start and Child Development Conference in New
Orleans complained of the menial positions blacks filled in the Jung Hotel as
well as incidents in which the city’s tourism businesses denied service to black
delegates. The group demanded the passage of a city ordinance by January 1,
1970, threatening to contact the NFL commissioner and the players of both
teams planning to play in the city’s first Super Bowl. It promised to urge all
organizations planning conventions in the Crescent City to revisit that deci-
sion.109 Local black organizations responded very frankly to requests for infor-
mation from groups considering whether New Orleans could properly handle
their conventions, admitting freely that the city had considerable problems.
The conservative chamber of commerce, mindful of the city’s image but
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oblivious to its racial problems, tried to reassure one such convention, repeat-
ing the familiar refrain from the early 1960s that “teams are repeatedly sent
back to the same bar to build up a case.”110
When some white and black delegates in town for the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) conference in August 1969 attempted to test the two bars on
University Place that had denied Frontiers delegates drinks, they faced the
same discriminatory treatment. One barmaid allegedly remarked, “The only
thing worse than niggers is whites that bring niggers in here,” while a New
Orleans Police Department officer removed one black delegate for refusing to
leave. In addition to passing a resolution recommending that the AFL-CIO and
all of its affiliates blacklist New Orleans when considering future convention
sites, the AFT picketed the two offending lounges. Thugs manning the
entrance to the Topaz Bar repelled picketers by spraying an unknown foreign
substance. The AFT filed a $1 million lawsuit in federal district court against
the two bars and Mayor Schiro.111
EMBRACING NATIONAL STANDARDS
By the latter half of 1969, a broad coalition of tourist interests, business and
civic leadership groups, neighborhood associations, civil rights groups, and
churches rallied for a public accommodations ordinance.112 Local supporters
of an ordinance marshaled evidence of lost tourist business and the prospect of
continued problems in their campaign to convince the New Orleans City
Council to act. They cited the persistent pattern of businesses relaxing discrim-
ination during major conventions only to revert to Jim Crow when the dele-
gates left town. Charles Keller Jr., president of the Metropolitan Area
Committee, a prestigious civic organization formed in 1966 to address com-
munity problems, warned of the damage that could result if the many reported
racial incidents in taxicabs and French Quarter businesses over the previous
two years continued when the National League of Cities convention arrived in
December.113 In addition to developing a pamphlet, the HRC reminded the
mayor and city councilmen of the urgent need to pass such a law before the
Super Bowl game to avoid potential embarrassment.114
As the city council considered a public accommodations ordinance in
December 1969, councilman Moon Landrieu, like Schiro a protégé of Chep
Morrison, provided strong support for the proposal. Landrieu, who grew up in
a working-class New Orleans neighborhood, had developed an understanding
and sympathy for the plight of blacks. His years as an undergraduate and law
student at Loyola University, where he cultivated Catholic beliefs and interra-
cial friendships, influenced his attitude toward race. Landrieu was one of the
rare Louisiana politicians who refused to cower beneath the glare of traditional
leaders.115 He recognized both the political implications of the city’s shifting
racial demographics and the social and economic necessity of completing the
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arduous process of integrating the entire city. Indeed, by 1969, New Orleans,
whose African American population had reached about 45 percent, saw the
full effect of black political mobilization wrought by the federal Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Powerful black organizations such as SOUL (Southern Organiza-
tion for Unified Leadership) in the Ninth Ward and the creole-dominated
COUP (Community Organization for Urban Politics) in the Seventh Ward
embraced race as a viable organizing principle for mobilizing the black elec-
torate and inserted themselves into the city’s long-standing tradition of patron-
age politics. Landrieu understood and exploited this new reality.116
Although Landrieu, the leading proponent of a public accommodations
ordinance in the city council, had the support of the HRC and a coalition of
community and business leaders, he faced narrow-minded opponents who
either opposed or sought to dilute the bill. When Landrieu and Councilman
Henry Curtis introduced the bill on December 16, 1969, none of their col-
leagues was willing to endorse it. Fellow councilmen proposed an amendment
that would limit the bill’s coverage to the Central Business District and the
French Quarter, thereby allowing business owners to do as they pleased else-
where in the city. The amendment represented the views of many white New
Orleanians who still resented the protourism argument for integration. One let-
ter to Mayor Schiro epitomizes this persistent mindset:
From the way new hotels are springing up in and around New Orleans I had
thought that more tourists and conventions were coming to New Orleans to
escape fratinization [sic] with Negroes. . . . The most disheartening part of [the
push for an ordinance] is to see spokesmen for the hotels and others not even
bother to conceal their motives with high moral tones. They frankly put the dol-
lar above public concern or public safety. New Orleans has existed very well
without mixed drinking and without the Super Bowl and it is time the white
majority made their feelings known.117
HRC leaders hurried to counter the amendment at a public hearing on
December 23, when the council planned to vote on the measure. The HRC
instructed the representatives of the many organizations supporting the origi-
nal ordinance to argue against the amendment on the grounds that limiting cov-
erage would insult local citizens; would not protect tourists who sought food,
drink, or entertainment in the vicinity of Tulane Stadium or the New Orleans
Fair Grounds racetrack; and would work against the Tourist Commission’s
efforts to encourage visitors to stay longer and see more of the city besides the
French Quarter.118 At least one black leader expressed disbelief that tourism
could be the primary consideration in passing an ordinance that any progres-
sive city would have done anyway for the benefit of its own citizens. However,
tourist industry leaders also deplored efforts to weaken the ordinance.119 On
December 23, the city council unanimously passed the ordinance without
amendments, which took effect January 1, 1970. Finally, after a decade of agi-
tation, New Orleans took its place among the nation’s cities.
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Metropolitan Area Committee chairman Sam Israel lauded the councilmen,
noting that “the public accommodations ordinance takes on added signifi-
cance . . . when you realize that the change resulted from the democratic pro-
cess and not from court action.” For the African American community, this
victory rang hollow. By 1969, New Orleans had muddled through half a
decade since the federal order to desegregate pubic accommodations. The
Plain Truth, a black newspaper published by New Orleans’s Free Southern
Theatre, contended that the ordinance would do little to help the plight of black
New Orleanians but would bring “real and substantial benefits to the white
business community . . . as a ‘guarantee’ to large conventions and the Super
Bowl.” In its bitter conclusion, the editorial suggested that perhaps the ordi-
nance had done one thing other than to give black people a right they should
already have enjoyed: “Also, as a result of our experiences with the ordinance,
we should now know how to exert economic pressure through outside conven-
tions and the Super Bowl.”120
Although the public accommodations law proved almost anticlimactic, it
heralded a “new” New Orleans in which a modern tourist industry could flour-
ish. The ordinance is best seen in the context of the whirlwind of social, eco-
nomic, political, and cultural change that enveloped the city in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. In the span of only a few years, the Crescent City landed pro-
fessional football, resuscitated its flagging Mardi Gras celebration, achieved
meaningful black involvement in local politics, infused its blue-blood business
community with a new breed of leaders, and laid Jim Crow to rest once and for
all. If the city stood on the threshold of a phenomenal oil boom that would give
its dreamers new visions of closing the gap with Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, and
Miami, it also stood on the cusp of a spectacular ascendancy of the tourist and
convention industry over the next three decades.
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